In 2001, Lee et al. proposed a strong non-designated proxy signature for the use of multi-proxy signatures at the presence of plural delegations of multiple original signers. In this paper, we shall analyze their schemes and offer some suggestions as to how to improve the security of those schemes.
INTRODUCTION
Proxy signature schemes (Mambo et al., 1996a) , (Mambo et al., 1996b) are what original signers can use to delegate their signing capability to so-called proxy signers. In these schemes, a proxy signature key is created by using the original signer's signature key. Then the proxy signer creates a signature to sign on behalf of the original signer. Several proxy signature schemes have been widely studied (Das et al., 2007) , (Gu et al., 2005) , (Guo and Liu, 2006) , (Hwang et al., 2000) , (Kim et al., 1997) , (Petersen and Horster, 1997) , (Sun, 1999) , (Tzeng et al., 2002) . In 2001, Lee et al. proposed a proxy signature scheme (Lee et al., 2001b) . They have considered a number of possible attacks on their predecessors in their scheme.
Based on the types of weaknesses, Lee et al. (Lee et al., 2001b) have classified proxy signatures into strong and weak ones in terms of undeniability. A strong proxy signature can work both as an original signer's signature and as a proxy signer's signature, while a weak proxy signature can only act as an original signer's signature.
In addition, Lee et al. (Lee et al., 2001b ) have also classified proxy signatures into designated and non-designated ones in terms of the designation of the proxy signer. They have shown that a strong proxy signature can be used without any proxy signer being designated, because the proxy signature has explicit authentic information about the proxy signer. Based on the above classifications, Lee et al. have proposed a Strong Non-designated Proxy Signature (SNPS) scheme and applied it to multi-proxy signature schemes in which multiple original signers delegate their signing capabilities to unspecified proxy signers.
In this article, we shall show various attacks on the above SNPS scheme and the SNPS-implemented multi-proxy signature scheme. Those schemes cannot satisfy the strong unforgeability requirement. Any third party or original signer is not designated as a proxy signer and thus is not allowed to create a valid proxy signature of the proxy signer. However, the original signer, or one of the original signers, can forge a valid proxy signature for the proxy signer which the proxy signer cannot repudiate.
In Sections 2 and 3, we shall review the SNPS scheme and observe how it can be applied to the construction of a multi-proxy signature scheme, and we shall also point out their weaknesses, respectively. In Section 4, our improved schemes and the security analysis of the improved schemes will be proposed and presented. Finally, the concluding remarks will be in the last section.
THE SNPS SCHEME AND ITS APPLICATION
In this section, we shall briefly review the Lee et al.'s SNPS scheme (LKK-SNPS for short) (Lee et al., 2001b) and its contribution to a multi-proxy signature scheme (Lee et al., 2001b) .
Review of the SNPS Scheme
There are three phases in the LKK-SNPS scheme: proxy key issuing, proxy signer signing, and proxy signature verifying. Initially, the system parameters are defined as follows. Let p be a large prime, q be a prime factor of p−1, g be a generator of order q ∈ Z * p , and h(·) be a one-way hash function. The warrant m w records the identity of the original signer and the valid delegation time, etc. m w does not include the identity of any proxy signer.
Each user U i owns a private key x i ∈ Z * q and corresponding public key y = g x i mod p, which are certified by the certificate authority (CA). Let U o be the original signer and U p be the proxy signer.
• Proxy Key Issuing: U o chooses a random number k and computes r = g k mod p and σ = x o h(m w , r) + k mod q. The tuple (m w , r, σ) is U o 's signature on m w . U o sends (m w , r, σ) to U p . After receiving (m w , r, σ), U p verifies by checking whether the following equation holds:
If it holds, U p computes her/his proxy private key σ p as
• Proxy Signer Signing: If a message m conforms to m w , U p can generate a proxy signature on m as s = S(σ p , m) using her/his proxy private key σ p , where S(·) is a general signature generation algorithm. The tuple (m, s, m w , r, y o , y p ) is a valid proxy signature.
• Proxy Signature Verifying: The verifier computes the corresponding proxy public key:
The verifier can verify (m, s, m w , r, y o , y p ) by checking if m ∈ {m w } and V (y, m, σ) ? = true, where V (·) is a general signature verification algorithm. If those expressions hold, the proxy signature (m, s, m w , r, y o , y p ) for m is valid.
Review of the Multi-Proxy
Signature Scheme
be the original group of n original signers. Now, they are trying to delegate their signing capabilities to some unspecified proxy signers. First, they can perform the same steps as the proxy key issuing phase in SNPS scheme. Each
, U p verifies it by Equation (1). If U p wants to create a proxy signature on behalf of G under warrants {m w 1 , m w 2 , · · · , m w n }, she/he has to generate her/his proxy private key σ p as
Then, any verifier can generate the proxy public key y as
Then, the verifier can check the validity of proxy signature by examining if V (y, m, s) ? = true and m ∈ {m w 1 , m w 2 , · · · , m w n }.
CRYPTANALYSIS
In this section, we shall analyze the security of the SNPS scheme and the SNPS-implemented multiproxy signature scheme.
Cryptanalysis of the SNPS Scheme
In this subsection, we will show that the LKK-SNPS scheme is vulnerable to the public key substitution and direct forgery attacks. The original signer can generate a valid proxy signature key σ p with respect to an arbitrary user. Let the arbitrary user be some proxy signer U p .
In the public key substitution attack, U o can make the public key substitution attack feasible. U o selects a random number k ∈ Z q , and computes r = g k mod p. Then, she/he selects a random number α ∈ Z q and updates her/his public key y o by y o = g α (y −h(m w ,r) −1 p ) mod p. Thus, the valid proxy signature key is σ p = αh(m w , r) + k mod q. The following expressions show why σ p is valid.
Finally, U o can forge a valid proxy signature (m, s, m w , r, y o , y p ). In fact, U p has never signed the message m, but she/he cannot deny it.
In the direct forgery attack, U o randomly selects a number k ∈ Z q and computes r = g k y −1 p mod p. Then, she/he computes a valid proxy signature key σ p = x o h(m w , r) + k mod q because
Similarly, U o can forge a valid proxy signature, and U p cannot deny to signing the message m.
Cryptanalysis of the Multi-Proxy
In this subsection, we will show that the Lee-KimKim multi-proxy signature is vulnerable to the collusion attack, the public key substitution attack, and the direct forgery attack. Cooperation of all the original signers or one malicious original signer can forge valid multi-proxy signatures. Without loss of generality, suppose {U o 1 ,U o 2 , · · · ,U o n } want to forge a multi-proxy signature on m for an arbitrarily chosen proxy signer U p by collusion attack. U o 1 first selects k o 1 and computes r o 1 = g k o 1 y −1 p mod p and σ 1 = x o 1 h(m w 1 , r o 1 ) + k o 1 mod q. Thus, the valid multiproxy signature key is σ p = σ 1 + · · · + σ n mod q. The following expressions show why σ p is valid.
Therefore, all the original signers can work together and use σ p to generate a forged multi-proxy signature on an arbitrary message m for an arbitrary proxy signer U p .
In the public key substitution attack, any original signer can forge valid multi-proxy signatures by updating her/his own public key. Suppose that U o 1 wants to forge a multi-proxy signature on m for {U o 1 ,U o 2 , · · · ,U o n }. This attack is similar in Section 3.1. U o 1 first selects random numbers m w i , k o i for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and α, and then she/he computes r o i = g k o i mod p and
Then, U o 1 makes a request to CA for updating her/his public key by y o 1 . Thus, the valid proxy signature key is σ p = αh(m w 1 , r o 1 ) + k o 1 mod q, and its corresponding proxy public key is y = g σ p mod p. This is because
Therefore, U o 1 can use σ p to generate a forged multi-proxy signature on an arbitrary message m for
In the directing forgery attack, we assume U o 1 wants to forge a multi-proxy signature on m for
The forgery attack is also similar in Section 3.1. U o 1 first selects random numbers m w i and k o i for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, and then she/he computes
Then the valid proxy signature key is σ p = x o 1 h(m w 1 , r o 1 ) + k o 1 mod q, and its corresponding proxy public key is y = g σ p mod p. This is because
OUR IMPROVEMENT
In this section, we modify the SNPS scheme and its multi-proxy signature scheme to remedy the weaknesses described in Section 3.
The Improved Schemes
In the SNPS scheme, the proxy signature can be forged by the original signer. We modify the scheme as follows. In the proxy signer signing phase, we turn Equation (2) into
Therefore, the proxy public key y becomes
To remedy the weaknesses of the multi-proxy signature scheme, we shall treat it similarly. The new σ p in Equation (3) is 
Security Analysis
The improved schemes can withstand all the above attacks in Section 3. In the SNPS scheme, suppose the signer U o is a malicious original signer. U o selects a random integer α and makes her/his public key y o satisfy the following equation
If U o fixes the integer y o , she/he will have to solve the discrete logarithm problem to find the value of α; on the other hand, if U o first determines the integer α, then she/he has to obtain the value of y o by solving the difficult problem. Therefore, the public key substitution attack is not likely to work.
As for the directing forgery attack, the security analysis is the same as that of the public key substitution attack on the improved schemes. The proxy signature cannot be forged by direct forgery attack. Therefore, those attacks on the improved SNPS scheme and its application to multi proxy signatures are impossible since it is difficult to obtain the proxy signature.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that strong nondesignated proxy signature schemes and their applications to multi-proxy signature schemes are vulnerable to some attacks. The malicious original signer can forge valid strong non-designated proxy signatures and multi-proxy signatures. Furthermore, the proxy signer cannot repudiate the forged proxy signatures. Therefore, we have also presented our improved scheme to defeat those attacks.
Lee et al. have also presented several mobile applications of strong proxy signatures. In (Lee et al., 2001a) , Lee et al. have shown that mobile agents can be constructed by using strong non-designated proxy signatures. However, the same attacks on strong non-designated proxy signatures can be generalized to work on Lee-Kim-Kim "secure" mobile agents. Again, our improved scheme can be used here to defeat these attacks.
